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The Security Council of the United Nations




For the first twenty years of its existence, the United Nations played
no particular role in the implementation of international humanitarian
law. The main reason for this lack of action, it has been argued, was the
fear that such involvement could be misinterpreted as an admission of
failure on the part of the United Nations to achieve its most important
objective, the maintenance of international peace and security, and as un-
dermining to some extent the fundamental principle of non-use of force
enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter.'
The reality of the use of force and the great number of armed con-
flicts could not continue to be overlooked. Thus, since the Middle East
Crisis of 1967, the United Nations has taken various actions regarding the
implementation of international humanitarian law,2 of which the most re-
* Legal Officer, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations. The
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1. On the basis of this argument, the International Law Commission of the United Na-
tions refused to include in its program of work the topic of the laws of war. Report of the
International Law Commission to the UN General Assembly, included in Y.B INT'L L. CoM-
MISSION % 18 (1949). See also Abi-Saab, The Implementation of Humanitarian Law, in THE
NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 310, 333 (A. Cassese ed., 1979); Sassoli, Mise
en oeuvre du Droit International Humanitaire et du Droit International des Droits de
l'Homme: Une Comparaison, in 1987 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 24, 48.
2. The United Nations, moreover, from that period on engaged itself in developing this
body of law. Following the International Conference on Human Rights in 1969, the General
Assembly adopted a number of resolutions; see, e.g. Respect of Human Rights in Armed
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cent expression is the adoption of several resolutions by the Security
Council on the Persian Gulf crisis.
This article will focus on the role of the Security Council in the im-
plementation of humanitarian law. This is not to say that the activities in
this field of other United Nations organs, such as the General Assembly
and the Secretary-General, the Commission on Human Rights, and relief
bodies, are of a lesser importance. Each merits a full, independent discus-
sion. The Security Council, however, is the organ entrusted under the
Charter with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. It appears recently to finally be performing its
functions as envisaged by the drafters of the Charter. Most importantly,
it is the only organ which can make binding decisions.
Part II of this article briefly outlines various means of implementing
international humanitarian law treaties. Part III presents an analysis of
the actions of the Security Council to date in that field. Part IV evaluates
the measures adopted so far by the Council and examines other possible
actions that it can take under international law in cases of armed con-
flicts. The article focuses on the responses of the Council to actions by
states and thus does not address the question of the implementation of
humanitarian law by United Nations forces sent by the Security Council,
which is a separate issue. 3
Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444 (XXIII), 1748th mtg. (Jan. 13, 1969). The Secretary-General, in
response to the Assembly's request, prepared two reports on the topic, which inter alia
contained suggestions for the development of humanitarian law; see U.N. Doc. A/7720
(1969); U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970). However, the process of development remained at the time
largely outside the framework of the United Nations. Thus, the 1977 Protocols Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 were elaborated on by a Diplomatic Conference
convened by Switzerland, on the basis of draft texts prepared by the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross. See the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [herein-
after First Geneva Convention]; the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention]; the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. See also
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 11255 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol II].
3. See, e.g., Schindler, United Nations Forces and International Humanitarian Law,
in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN
HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET 521 (C. Swinarsky ed., 1984)[hereinafter STUDIES AND ESSAYS];
Komenov, The Origin of State and Entity Responsibility for Violations of International
.Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-
RIAN LAW 169 (F. Kalshoven and Y. Sandoz eds., 1989). In this connection, the Secretary-
General has drawn attention to the need to reflect on the questions of "mechanisms re-
quired for the Council to satisfy itself that ... the rules of humanitarian law applicable in
armed conflicts are complied with" When the use of force has been authorized by the Coun-
cil, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/46/1, at 3 (1991). The Model Agreement between
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW TREATIES
Most instruments codifying the laws of war are classical treaties
largely leaving implementation to each Party. The Geneva Conventions of
1949, however, in order to ensure their implementation, rendered
mandatory the institution of Protecting Powers which had been widely
resorted to in practice, but left the activation of the procedure to the
states concerned.4 In the absence of Protecting Powers, the following
"substitutes" are available to fulfill their duties: "an organization which
offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy," ' "a neutral State or
such an organization,"' or "a humanitarian organization, such as the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross."' As for Additional Protocol I, it
further strengthened the above system by expressly stating the legal obli-
gation, implicit in the Geneva Conventions, that the Parties have the
duty to appoint a Protecting Power, and by providing for various means
to ensure such an appointment or that of a substitute.8 The Geneva Con-
ventions also provide for the institution of an enquiry concerning alleged
violations thereof, at the request of a Party. The actual procedure is again
left to the Parties or, in the absence of agreement, to an umpire chosen
by them.' Protocol I institutionalizes this process with an optional clause
on compulsory resort to an International Fact-Finding Commission estab-
lished under Article 90 to enquire into allegations of violations of the
Conventions and the Protocol, to "facilitate, through its good offices, the
the United Nations and Member States contributing personnel and equipment to United
Nations peace-keeping operations, recently prepared by the Secretariat, provides that such
operations "shall observe and respect the principles and spirit of the general international
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel." U.N. Doc. A/46/185 art. X
(1991).
4. Common article 8 of the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions and article 9
of the Fourth Geneva Convention provide that "[t]he present Convention shall be applied
with the co-operation and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to
safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict." For a discussion of the history and
role of the institution of Protecting Powers, see Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at 311. The co-
operation of the Protecting Powers in the execution of the treaty is also envisaged in the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14,
1954, art. 2, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
5. Common article 8, T 1 of the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions and arti-
cle 9 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
6. Common article 8, 2 of the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions and arti-
cle 9 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
7. Common article 8, 3 of the First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions and arti-
cle 9 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Unlike the first alternative for a substitute, which is
decided upon by the High Contracting Parties, it is the Detaining Power that has the obli-
gation to choose between the last two alternatives in the absence of Protecting Powers or a
substitute organization under paragraph 1, or to accept the offer of a humanitarian organi-
zation. See, e.g., Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at 318.
8. Protocol I, art. 5.
9. Common article 52 of the First Geneva Convention, 53 of the Second, 132 of the
Third and 149 of the Fourth. This procedure has never been used.
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restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and th[e]
Protocol.""0
An innovative element of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I is
the obligation for the High Contracting Parties not only to respect but
also to ensure respect for the relevant instruments."1 This covers two
types of obligations: a Party must adopt the necessary measures to ensure
the implementation of the instrument by itself, particularly integration
into its municipal law; it must also, irrespective of whether it is a party to
the conflict, endeavor to bring another Contracting Party which has vio-
lated the treaty back to an attitude of respect for that treaty.12
This rather sophisticated legal system of implementation did not suc-
ceed in averting violations of international humanitarian law. Before 1949
the principle of reciprocity and the right to reprisals worked to some ex-
tent as a deterrent for such violations. It left open, however, the very real
possibility of the lawful violation of humanitarian law against a party to
the conflict which had violated this law first - hardly a satisfactory solu-
tion. Therefore, the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I prohibit reprisals
against protected persons and objects.'" Moreover, the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties prohibits reciprocity with regard to the
application of treaties of humanitarian character.' As for the institution
of Protecting Powers:
The assumption which prevailed during the elaboration of the Con-
ventions that States would never hesitate to appoint and accept, or to
serve as Protecting Powers was ... disproved in practice.
15
10. The International Fact-Finding Commission was established on 25 June 1991, after
twenty High Contracting Parties made declarations recognizing its competence under Arti-
cle 90 of Protocol I. ICRC Press Release, No. 10, June 27, 1991.
11. Common article 1 of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Geneva Conventions; and
Protocol I, art. 1.
12. COMMENTARY TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949. art. 1 (J. Pictet ed.,
1958) thereinafter COMMENTARY]. For more details on the obligation to ensure respect for
the Conventions and Protocol I see, e.g., Condorelli and Boisson de Chazournes, Quelques
remarques a propos de l'obligation de 'respecter et faire respecter' le droit international
humanitaire 'en toutes circonstances', in STUDIES AND ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 17; Levrat,
Les conskquences de l'engagement pris par les Hautes Parties contractantes de 'faire re-
specter' les Conventions humanitaires, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-
RIAN LAW, supra note 3, at 263.
13. First Geneva Convention art. 46, Second Geneva Convention art. 47, Third Geneva
Convention art. 13, V. 3, Fourth Geneva Convention art. 33, V 3; Protocol I art. 20, art. 51,
6, art. 52, 1, art. 53, 1 c, art. 54, 4, art. 55, 1 2, and art. 56, T 4. As a matter of fact,
reprisals against prisoners of war have been prohibited since 1929. Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, art. 2, 347, T.S. 846. Furthermore, the
Convention for the Protection Of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, also prohibits reprisals against protected cultural property, supra note 4, at art. 4,
4. See also Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at 310.
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, 9 5, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969).
15. Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at 324. Resort to Protecting Powers has been limited to




In contrast, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
has been playing a crucial role in the implementation of humanitarian
law, given its right of initiative to undertake humanitarian activities, sub-
ject to the consent of the Parties, 6 in addition to specific mandates at-
tributed to it under the Geneva instruments." Its flexible and discrete
way of operating has greatly contributed to its success.
It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which States fulfilled their
obligation "to ensure respect" for international humanitarian law, due to
the necessarily discrete nature of diplomatic demarches to that effect.
Such practice does not, however, seem to be overwhelming as far as bilat-
eral contacts are concerned.'" What then about multilateral means "to
ensure respect" for international humanitarian law?
Unlike the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I expressly mentions the
United Nations in relation to the implementation of international hu-
manitarian law. Article 89, entitled "Co-operation," reads:
In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or in-
dividually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity
with the United Nations Charter.
Nevertheless, the scope of this provision is much more limited than
certain proposals on the role of the United Nations put forward before
the adoption of the Protocol. 9
Aside from the "system" of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols,
two other treaties relating to international humanitarian law involve the
United Nations in their implementation. The Convention on the Prohibi-
tion of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction provides that a
State Party may lodge a complaint regarding the violation of the Conven-
tion by another State Party with the Security Council, which may carry
out an investigation on the matters.20 The Convention on the Prohibition
of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
16. Common article 9 of the First, Second and Third Geneva Conventions and article
10 of the Fourth with respect to international armed conflicts, and Common article 3 with
respect to non-international armed conflicts.
17. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention art. 126, and Fourth Geneva Convention art.
143, relating respectively to visits to prisoners of war and civilian internees and relief
assistance.
18. Condorelli, supra note 12, at 27; Levrat, supra note 12, at 291.
19. In particular, proposals were made to the effect that an organ established by the
United Nations assume the duties of the Protecting Powers. See Abi-Saab, supra note 1, at
339.
20. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological, Biological and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction art. VI, G.A. Res.
2826 (XXVI), Dec. 16, 1971, annex [hereinafter Convention on the Prohibition of Toxin
Weapons].
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Techniques contains a similar provision.2" Both Conventions moreover
provide that consultation and co-operation between States Parties relat-
ing to the application of the Conventions may also be undertaken through
appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United
Nations.22
Before concluding this brief survey of means of implementation of
international humanitarian law treaties, mention should be made of one
important non-legal means for ensuring their implementation: public
opinion. Public statements and appeals by states, international organiza-
tions, non-governmental organizations and the ICRC may in certain cases
have an impact, because no party to an armed conflict is indifferent to its
public image.23
III. THE PRACTICE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The United Nations has taken decisions on the implementation of
international humanitarian law since 1967. Security Council activity in
this regard is quite extensive and is increasing.
The first express mention by the Security Council of the Geneva
Conventions was not couched in strong terms. By Resolution 237, relating
to the Middle East, the Security Council recommended "to the Govern-
ments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles
governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian




Subsequently, the Security Council has taken a large number of ac-
tions with respect to the implementation of international humanitarian
law. These can be divided into several categories.
2
1
A. Calls and Demands for Respect of International Humanitarian Law
Demands for respect of international humanitarian law have been
unequivocal. Thus, the relevant operative paragraph of a Security Council
Resolution either calls for respect of certain rules of international human-
itarian law expressly mentioned, usually by citing conventions, 26 or calls
21. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, art. V, G.A. Res. 31/72, Dec. 10, 1976, annex [hereinfafter
Convention of Prohibition of Military Environmental Techniques].
22. Id.; see also Convention on the Prohibition of Toxin Weapons, supra note 20, at
art. V.
23. Veuthey, Pour une politique humanitaire, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS, supra note 3, at
998.
24. S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 1361st mtg., 3 (June 14, 1967).
25. The categorization below is made for the purposes of the analysis. Several types of
actions can, of course, be taken under the same resolution.
26. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 307, 3, U.N. SCOR, 1621st mtg. (Dec. 21, 1971) on the situation
in the India/Pakistan subcontinent, which reads:
[The Security Council. . .] calls upon all those concerned to take all measures
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for the cessation of specific actions, characterized - often in the pream-
ble - as violations of international humanitarian law.2" In the last few
necessary to preserve human life and for the observance of the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949 and to apply in full their provisions as regards the protection
of the wounded and sick, prisoners of war and civilian population.
See also the following resolutions on the Middle East: S.C. Res. 271, U.N. SCOR, 1512nd
mtg. (Sep. 15, 1969) (which calls upon Israel to observe the Geneva Conventions and inter-
national law governing military occupation); S.C. Res. 484, U.N. SCOR, 2260th mtg. (Dec.
19, 1980); S.C. Res. 672, U.N. SCOR, 2948th mtg. (Oct. 12, 1990) (which calls upon Israel to
comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention); U.N. Doc. S/21363 (June 19, 1990) (the state-
ment of the President of the Security Council which calls upon Israel to comply with the
Fourth Convention); S.C. Res. 512, U.N. SCOR, 2380th mtg. (June 19, 1982); S.C. Res. 513,
U.N. SCOR, 2382nd mtg. (July 4, 1982); S.C. Res. 520, U.N. SCOR, 2395th mtg. (Sep. 17,
1982); S.C. Res. 521, U.N. SCOR, 2396th mtg. (Sep. 19, 1982)(calling for respect for the
rights of the civilian populations). See also the following statements by the President of the
Security Council regarding the conflict between Iran and Iraq: U.N. Doc. S/16454 (1984),
statement of Mar. 30, 1984, whereby the members of the Council called on the parties to
adhere to the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poi-
sonous or Other Gases, and of the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of June 17, 1925, 94
L.N.T.S. 2138, at 65 [hereinafter "1925 Geneva Protocol"]; U.N. Doc. S/17130 (1985)(urging
the parties to observe international humanitarian law); S.C. Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, 2750th
mtg. (July 20, 1987) (urging that POWs be released and repatriated without delay after the
cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, in accordance with the Third Geneva Conven-
tion). As can be seen, the terminology of the Council's request or exhortation varies slightly
from case to case.
27. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 452 U.N. SCOR, 2159th mtg., V 3 (July 20, 1979) in which the
Security Council "[called] upon the Government and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent
basis the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories
occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem," an action characterized in the preamble as con-
stituting a violation of the Fourth Convention. See also the statements of the President of
the Security Council of May 26, 1976 and Nov. 11, 1976, 31 U.N. SCOR Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council (1976), at 4 [hereinafter "Resolutions and Decisions"],
and S.C. Res. 446, U.N. SCOR, 2134th mtg. (Mar. 22, 1979) calling on Israel to abide by the
Convention and, accordingly, to rescind its measures relating to the establishment of such
settlements and desist from any further such actions; S.C. Res. 465, U.N. SCOR, 2203rd
mtg. (Mar. 1, 1980), which makes a similar call, having determined in the operative part
that the above actions are a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention; S.C. Res.
476, U.N. SCOR, 2242nd mtg. (June 30, 1980), calling on Israel to desist from policies and
measures affecting the character and the status of Jerusalem, which are qualified in the
operative part as flagrant violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention; S.C. Res. 471, U.N.
SCOR, 2226th mtg. (June 5, 1980), determining that Israel has failed to provide adequate
protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in accordance with the
Fourth Geneva Convention and calling upon Israel to comply with that Convention; S.C.
Res. 605, U.N. SCOR, 2777th mtg. (Dec. 22, 1987), which calls upon Israel to desist from
policies and practices which violate the human rights of Palestinians and the above Conven-
tion; S.C. Res. 468, U.N. SCOR, 2221st mtg. (May 8, 1980) and S.C. Res. 469, U.N. SCOR,
2223rd mtg. (May 20, 1980), calling upon Israel, as the occupying Power, to rescind illegal
measures of expulsion of Palestinians in contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which is recalled in the preamble; S.C. Res. 636, U.N. SCOR, 2870th mtg. (July 6, 1989) and
S.C. Res. 641, U.N. SCOR, 2883rd mtg. (Aug. 30, 1989), which call upon Israel to ensure the
safe and immediate return of deported Palestinians and to desist from such deportations, a
violation of articles 47 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which are recalled in the
preamble; S.C. Res. 694, U.N. SCOR, 2989th mtg. (May 2, 1991), which declares in its oper-
ative part that the deportation by the Israeli authorities of four Palestinians is in violation
1992
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years, the Security Council has used stronger wording, "demanding" 8 or
"requesting"" respect for international humanitarian law. In the Iraq-
Kuwait crisis, moreover, the Security Council expressly acted under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Its resolutions request-
ing Iraq to comply with international humanitarian law, and particularly
with the Fourth Geneva Convention, were thus clearly binding.3 0 In that
case, Iraq was under a double obligation: to apply the Fourth Geneva
Convention as a party thereto, and to comply with Article 25 of the Char-
ter as a Member of the United Nations.3 '
These calls for the respect of international humanitarian law, as well
as the actions discussed below, are based on the competence of the Secur-
ity Council under Article 24 of the Charter, i.e. the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. The Security Council is certainly competent
to deal with the implementation of international humanitarian law, which
is applicable in situations affecting the maintenance of international
peace and security, namely armed conflicts. 2
Regarding the Geneva Conventions, one could argue, given their vir-
tually universal acceptance,33 that the Security Council is a means of ful-
filling the obligation embodied in Common Article 1 to ensure that the
of the Fourth Geneva Convention and reiterates that Israel refrain from such acts; S.C. Res.
540, U.N. SCOR, 2493rd mtg. (Oct. 31, 1983) on the situation between Iran and Iraq, which
calls for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, a viola-
tion of international humanitarian law; S.C. Res. 612, U.N. SCOR, 2812nd mtg. (May 9,
1988), which expects Iran and Iraq to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons, in
accordance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
28. See U.N. Doc. S/17932 (1986) (the Presidential statement of March 21, 1986, "de-
manding" the respect of the 1925 Geneva Protocol); U.N. Doc. S/18863 (1987) (the state-
ment of May 14, 1987 "emphatically demanding" the same).
29. See S.C. Res. 607, U.N. SCOR 2780th mtg. (Jan. 5, 1988), "strongly requesting"
Israel to comply with the Fourth Geneva Convention; see also S.C. Res. 608, U.N. SCOR,
2781st mtg. (Jan. 14, 1988); U.N. Doc. S/20156 (1988) (the Aug. 26, 1988 presidential state-
ment "requesting" Israel to desist from deporting Palestinians, a violation of the above-
mentioned Convention).
30. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 2951st mtg. (Oct. 29, 1990). S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR,
2937th mtg. (Aug. 18, 1990) does not specifically mention the Fourth Geneva Convention,
but it deals also with the right for aliens to leave the territory of a party to a conflict,
enshrined in article 35 of the Convention. In S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 2939th mtg. (Sept.
13, 1990), the Security Council "expected" compliance with S.C. Res. 664 (1990) and af-
firmed the responsibility of Iraq for the well-being and safety of third state nationals in
accordance with international humanitarian law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention.
31. Article 25 reads "[t]he members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
32. The actions of the Security Council discussed in this article are cited in the Reper-
toire of the Practice of the Security Council under the chapter dealing with the "Considera-
tion of Questions under the Council's Responsibility for the Maintenance of International
Peace and Security". See, e.g., Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Supple-
ment 1969-1971 at 94, regarding S.C. Res. 307, supra note 26.
33. In 1968, 111 out of 126 Member States were parties to the four Conventions. In
early 1991, 157 out of 159 Member States were parties to the Conventions. All five perma-
nent members of the Security Council are parties to the Conventions.
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Geneva Conventions are respected when the Council calls for such respect
by the parties to the conflict. The High Contracting Parties which are
members of the Security Council would thus act through the Council to
ensure respect of the Conventions. This does not seem to be the case.
Article 89 of Protocol I, in requiring the High Contracting Parties to co-
operate with the United Nations - albeit only in the case of "serious
violations" - clearly envisages independent actions by the U.N., in the
latter's own name and not as a channel for the Parties, which are the only
addressees of Common Article 1. One type of action by the United Na-
tions is to make such calls for respect of international humanitarian law. 4
The Security Council made this clear in one recent instance where it is-
sued an appeal not only to the Parties in conflict, but also called upon the
High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, "to ensure
respect by Israel, the Occupying Power, for its obligations under the Con-
vention in accordance with article 1 thereof.""6 In so doing, the Security
Council clearly recognized that the obligation to ensure respect is incum-
bent, under the Convention, upon the High Contracting Parties them-
selves, independently of the Council's own actions to the same effect. The
Security Council's calls for respect of international humanitarian law are,
however, an important substitute to the inactivity of the High Con-
tracting Parties, as well as an expression of the position of the interna-
tional community regarding the implementation of humanitarian law.
B. Determination That Certain Acts Constitute Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law
The Security Council has also explicitly determined that certain acts
or measures undertaken by states violate international humanitarian law,
usually in combination with calls for respect of the law.36 The importance
of such a pronouncement by the Council lies in the public pressure it
creates on the country in question. It makes it very difficult for a state to
convincingly claim that its actions do not violate international humanita-
rian law when an authoritative body such as the Security Council declares
that they do. And, last but not least, such a determination, which
amounts to a formal designation as a wrong doer, may lead the Council to
34. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 1035 (Y. Sandoz, C.
Swinarski, B. Zimermann eds., 1987).
35. S.C. Res. 681, U.N. SCOR, 2970th mtg. (Dec. 20, 1990). See also U.N. Doc. S/20156
(1988); U.N. Doc. S/21363 (1990) (the statements by the President).
The Security Council's calls upon the High Contracting Parties to ensure respect for
the Conventions also covers states which are not members of the United Nations. Indeed,
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 6 stipulates that
The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United Nations act in accordance with [its] principles so far as may be neces-
sary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
36. See supra note 27, as well as S.C. Res. 674, supra note 30, indicating that certain
actions by Iraq against third-state nationals and Kuwaitis violated the Fourth Geneva
Convention.
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adopt more severe measures vis-a-vis the violating state.
C. Fact-finding and Implementation Monitoring
In order to make the factual determination whether there has been a
violation of international humanitarian law, the Security Council relies on
information received from other principal organs,37 the Member States
and the media. In certain cases, however, the Council has itself initiated
fact-finding activities and investigations.
The Security Council may request additional information on the im-
plementation of international humanitarian law primarily from two
sources. The most common is requesting the Secretary-General to follow-
up on the implementation of a resolution on respect for international hu-
manitarian law and to report thereon to the Council.s8 On the basis of
that report, the Security Council may then take further actions. For ex-
ample, the Security Council, having considered the report of the Secre-
tary-General on the implementation of Resolution 497, called an emer-
gency special session of the General Assembly on the situation in the
occupied Arab territories. 9
The practical aspects of the follow-up are normally left to the Secre-
tary-General. It may happen, however, that the Secretary-General en-
counters difficulties in the fulfillment of his fact-finding activities, due to
lack of co-operation from the state concerned. In particular, that state
may refuse to accept a representative of or a fact-finding mission of the
Secretary-General on its territory, or set unfavorable conditions. In such a
situation, the Council may request the state concerned to reconsider its
refusal and to co-operate with the Secretary-General. 40 Whether the deci-
sion of the receiving state would thus be changed depends in the end on
the moral and political persuasion of the Council, regardless of the legal
weight of its decisions. It is difficult to understand the refusal of a state
to accept a fact-finding mission sent by the Secretary-General, particu-
37. For example, reports of fact-finding missions sent by the Secretary-General on his
own initiative to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the conflict be-
tween Iran and Iraq.
38. See S.C. Res. 237, supra note 24; S.C. Res. 248, U.N. SCOR, 1407th mtg. (Mar. 24,
1968); S.C. Res. 259, U.N. SCOR, 1454th mtg. (Sept. 27, 1968); S.C. Res. 271, supra note 26;
S.C. Res. 307, supra note 26; S.C. Res. 468, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 469, supra note 27; S.C.
Res. 478, U.N. SCOR, 2245th mtg. (Aug. 20, 1980); S.C. Res. 484, supra note 26; S.C. Res.
497, U.N. SCOR, 2319th mtg. (Dec. 17, 1981); S.C. Res. 512, supra note 26; S.C. Res. 520,
supra note 26; S.C. Res. 521, supra note 26; S.C. Res. 605, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 681,
supra note 35. In this last resolution, the Council entrusted the Secretary-General for the
first time with ongoing responsibilities for the implementation of international humanita-
rian law with respect to the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation. U.N. Doc. S/
22472, 3 (1991).
39. S.C. Res. 500, U.N. SCOR, 2330th mtg. (Jan. 28, 1982).
40. See S.C. Res. 259, supra note 38. See also S.C. Res. 673, U.N. SCOR, 2949th mtg.
(Oct. 24, 1990), relating to a mission initiated by the Secretary-General himself and en-
dorsed by the Council in S.C. Res. 672.
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larly in the field of international humanitarian law, since the result of
that refusal is most likely to be negative publicity. Moreover, acceptance
of a fact-finding mission is also an exercise of sovereign rights, which does
not exclude the sovereign right to conduct one's own investigation and
have it publicized.
The Security Council has also established ad hoc fact-finding bodies
to examine the implementation of international humanitarian law. In
1979, the Council established a commission consisting of three of its
members "to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab
territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem.""' The Commission
concluded that the settlement policy of Israel constituted a violation of
the Fourth Geneva Convention,"2 a conclusion endorsed by the Council.
48
It appears, however, that there is a strong preference, at least among
some members of the Council, to entrust the Secretary-General rather
than an inter-governmental fact-finding body with the task of investigat-
ing allegations of violations of international humanitarian law. A recent
example is the veto by the United States of a resolution attempting to
establish another commission of three Council members to examine the
situation in the occupied territories. The United States argued that such
a commission "would too easily become a vehicle which could be misused
to generate more needless controversy and dispute in this area," while the
sending of a representative of the Secretary-General would be the "best
way to serve the interests of the United Nations in examining the situa-
tion in the occupied territories," without setting back the peace process.44
If one looks merely at the humanitarian rather than the political aspects
of the question, experience has proven indeed that the more discrete a
humanitarian mission, the greater its chances of success. The method of
work of the ICRC and its achievements are clearly a case in point.
D. Determination Regarding the Applicability of Humanitarian
Conventions
The Security Council has made several pronouncements on the appli-
cability of the Fourth Geneva Convention."" This Convention does not, as
41. S.C. Res. 446, supra note 27.
42. U.N. Doc. S/13450 1 226 (1979).
43. S.C. Res. 452, supra note 27. In that resolution, the Council requested a second
report, which the Commission produced later in the year, along the same lines. U.N. Doc.
13679 (1979). This report was endorsed by S.C. Res. 465.
44. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2926, at 37 (1990).
45. See the following resolutions and statements by the President of the Security Coun-
cil on the territories occupied by Israel: Resolutions and Decisions, supra note 27, at 4; S.C.
Res. 446, supra note 27, at preamble; S.C. Res 465, supra note 27, at preamble; S.C. Res.
471, supra note 27, at preamble; S.C. 478, supra note 38; S.C. Res. 484, supra note 26; S.C.
Res. 497, supra note 38; statement of Jan. 26, 1984, U.N. Doc. S/16433 (1984); S.C. Res. 605,
supra note 27; S.C. Res. 607, supra note 29; statement of Aug. 26, 1988, U.N. Doc. S/20156
(1988); S.C. Res. 636, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 641, supra note 27; statement of June 19,
1990, U.N. Doc. S/21363 (1990); S.C. Res. 672, supra note 26; statements of Jan. 4, 1991,
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one may have expected from the elaborate and unique implementation
system of international humanitarian law described in Part II above, pro-
vide for a body to determine the circumstances in which it is applicable;
neither do the Hague Conventions, nor the other Geneva Conventions for
that matter." Thus, the Security Council fills an important gap in expres-
sing the view of the international community on the actual legal situation
in question, which might otherwise remain unclear.4
The Fourth Geneva Convention also covers the situation in occupied
territories. The Security Council has so far raised the issue of the applica-
bility of the Fourth Geneva Convention only with regard to situations
involving what it expressly characterized as "occupations," namely the
territories occupied by Israel, and Iraqi occupied Kuwait. Whether a ter-
ritory is occupied or not is of course quite often a controversial question,
and that is where the above-mentioned clarity on the legal situation is
essential."' It must be noted, however, that the Council did not make sim-
ilar determinations in all cases of occupations it has been confronted
with. For example, the Council has not expressly pronounced itself on the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to northern Cyprus, al-
though the General Assembly has characterized the territory as
occupied."'
The effect of the determination by the Security Council that the
Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to a territory, which, in its view
is "occupied," may have important consequences. For instance, the Secur-
ity Council, having previously determined that Jerusalem is part of the
"occupied territories, "5 considered the enactment by Israel in 1980 of the
"basic law" changing the status of Jerusalem as null and void, and as not
affecting the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention."
The importance that the Security Council attaches to the issue of the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention is further evidenced by
Resolution 681, in which the Security Council, rather than making a sim-
U.N. Doc. S/22046 (1991); statements of Mar. 27, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22408 (1991); S.C. Res.
694, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 726, U.N. SCOR, 3022nd mtg. (Jan. 6, 1992). See the following
resolutions on the occupation of Kuwait: S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 2943rd mtg. (Sep. 25,
1990); S.C. Res. 674, supra note 30, at preamble.
46. See Roberts, What is a Military Occupation, in 1984 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 301
(1989).
47. Other international bodies, such as the General Assembly, the Organization of Afri-
can Unity, and the ICRC have expressed such a view. Id.
48. Obviously, if the Security Council mentions a humanitarian convention in any in-
stance, it implies that the convention is applicable to that situation. The legal issue of the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention has been addressed by the Security Council
only when it was felt necessary to do so expressly. See supra note 45.
49. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 37/253 (May 13, 1983). See also Roberts, supra note 46, at 302.
50. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 446, supra note 27.
51. S.C. Res. 478, supra note 38. See also S.C. Res. 497, supra note 38, in which the
Security Council "[decided] that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and




pie determination, urged the government of Israel "to accept the de jure
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention, of 1949, to all the territo-
ries occupied by Israel since 1967 and to abide scrupulously by the provi-
sions of the said Convention." Ultimately, it is only when a state does not
deny the applicability of a particular international obligation incumbent
upon them that there is hope that violations thereof may cease. States
always try to put forward justifications when accused of a breach of an
international obligation which they otherwise accept. If they do not even
accept that they are bound by that obligation, it is unreasonable to expect
compliance.
E. Condemnation and "Quasi-condemnation" of Violations of the
Rules of International Humanitarian Law
After the call for respect of international humanitarian law and the
determination that a state has breached that law, the next step the Secur-
ity Council can take is to condemn such actions. There are various de-
grees of such condemnations, in terms ranging from "regrets"5 or "de-
plores '1 3 to "strongly condemns." '  The choice of words is, of course, a
question of politics, including the degree to which the Security Council
wants to put public pressure on the state concerned.
F. Requests to States to Take Specific Actions as a Consequence of the
Violation of International Humanitarian Law
The Security Council may request states violating international hu-
manitarian law to take certain corrective actions. Such measures include
the cessation of the violation, but the Security Council can go further in
52. See e.g. S.C. Res. 636, supra note 27, in which the Security Council "deeply regrets"
the deportation of Palestinians by Israel. A milder terminology, such as "expresses deep
concern" is found in S.C. Res. 471, for example. S.C. Res. 471, supra note 27.
53. See e.g. S.C. Res. 582, U.N. SCOR, 2666th mtg. Feb. 24, 1986) and the statement of
the President of the Security Council of Dec. 22, 1986, U.N. Doc. S/18538 (1986), where the
violation of international humanitarian law in the Iran-Iraq war is "deplored;" S.C. Res.
641, supra note 27 and S.C. Res. 681, supra note 35, where deportations of Palestinians by
Israel are "deplored;" the statement of the President of the Security Council of Nov. 11,
1976, where certain measures taken by Israel in the occupied territories are "strongly de-
plored," Resolutions and Decisions, supra note 27, at 4; S.C. Res. 465, supra note 27, which
contains a similar provision, and the statement of Jan. 4, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22046 (1990),
where certain actions of the Israeli security forces are deplored.
54. See S.C. Res. 540, supra note 27, and the Mar. 30, 1984 statement of the President,
U.N. Doc. S/16454 (1984), where all violations of international humanitarian law in the
Iran-Iraq war are "condemned." See also statements made April 25, 1985, U.N. Doc. S/
17130 (1985), Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. S/17932 (1986), and Jan. 16, 1987, U.N. Doc. S/18610
(1987), where the use of chemical weapons in the same conflict is "strongly condemned."
See S.C. Res. 612, supra note 27, where the same action is "vigorously condemned" and S.C.
Res. 620, U.N. SCOR, 2870st mtg. (Aug. 26, 1988), where it is "resolutely condemned;" S.C.
Res. 674, supra note 30, condemning, in the preamble, certain actions by Iraq against third-
state nationals and Kuwaitis which were in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
S.C. Res. 762, supra note 45, where the decision of Israel to resume deportations of Palestin-
ian civilians from occupied territories is "strongly condemned."
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prescribing remedial actions, as in the following example. In Resolution
471 of 5 June 1980, the Council determined that Israel had failed to pro-
vide adequate protection to the civilian population in the occupied terri-
tories, as provided for in the Fourth Geneva Convention. Indeed, there
had been assassination attempts against three mayors in the area. In light
of these facts, the Security Council called upon Israel to "provide the vic-
tims with adequate compensation for the damages suffered as a result of"
the attempts.
The Security Council can moreover address itself to the other states.
Thus, the Security Council has called for "international assistance in the
relief of suffering and the rehabilitation of refugees" in the conflict be-
tween India and Pakistan.5 It has called upon "all States not to provide
Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connexion with settle-
ments in the occupied territories,"5 6 which it regards as illegal. The Coun-
cil also called upon all states "to continue to apply or to establish strict
control of the export ... of chemical products serving for the production
of chemical weapons" to Iran and Iraq, since use of such weapons during
the conflict had been established.5 7 As mentioned above, the Security
Council has also called upon the High Contracting Parties to fulfill their
obligation to ensure respect of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 8 A practi-
cal way of abiding by this obligation, as suggested by the Secretary-Gen-
eral, would be the support by the High Contracting Parties having con-
sulates in the occupied territories for the efforts of the ICRC and the
United Nations.5 9
G. Decisions Regarding Liability for Grave Breaches of International
Humanitarian Law
The invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq is not the only in-
stance where grave breaches of international humanitarian law were com-
mitted, but it is the first case where the Security Council, acting expressly
under Chapter VII of the Charter, particularly dealt with the legal conse-
quences of those breaches. As early as 25 September 1990, the Security
Council affirmed that Iraq was under an obligation to comply fully with
all the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and that Iraq was "liable
under the Convention in respect of the grave breaches committed by it, as
[were] individuals who commit[ed] or order[ed] the commission of grave
breaches." 0 These breaches included the mistreatment of third-State na-
tionals, in particular hostage-taking, the transfer of hostages to military
55. S.C. Res. 307, supra note 26. That resolution also authorized the Secretary-General
to appoint a special representative for dealing with humanitarian problems.
56. S.C. Res. 465, supra note 27; S.C. Res. 471, supra note 27.
57. S.C. Res. 612, supra note 27.
58. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
59. U.N. Doc. S/22472, 4 (1991).




targets, and mistreatment of Kuwaitis.
One member of the Security Council, Cuba, contended that the
Council did not have "the power to make decisions as to liability or to
determine compensation or restitution," since such matters could, under
the Charter, only be addressed by the International Court of Justice, the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations.6 1 The point is indeed well
taken that the Security Council cannot determine amounts of compensa-
tion, and in fact the Council did not. However, the Council is clearly com-
petent to merely affirm what the Fourth Geneva Convention stipulates,
namely that a state is liable for grave breaches committed by it. In fact,
under the Convention, a state remains liable for any grave breaches com-
mitted by it even if those individuals who committed those breaches have
been punished, as required by the Convention.2 The pronouncement of
the Council does not add anything to the obligations of Iraq as a High
Contracting Party; it simply highlights them.
Article 89 of Protocol I provides for the co-operation between the
High Contracting Parties and the United Nations in "situations of serious
violations of the Conventions" or Protocol I. It is presumably in that
spirit that the Security Council, in Resolution 674, invited States to "col-
late substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them
on the grave breaches by Iraq ... and to make this information available
to the Security Council."63 Neither this Resolution, nor the records of the
meeting at which it was adopted, are very clear on the use the Council
would make of this information. Of course, information on the persistence
of grave breaches would allow the Council to take further measures
against these violations; however the request for information covers not
only future but also past breaches perpetrated prior to the adoption of
Resolution 674. This invitation should also be read in conjunction with
the preambular paragraph of the Resolution reaffirming that Iraq is liable
under the Fourth Geneva Convention in respect of the grave breaches
committed by it. One may thus wonder whether, had the crisis been
peacefully resolved, this Resolution could not have served as a basis for
the establishment by the Security Council of a compensation mechanism
for these grave breaches.
Such a mechanism was established by the Gulf War Cease-fire Reso-
lution.6 ' In that Resolution, the Council reaffirmed the liability of Iraq
"for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the de-
pletion of any natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, na-
tionals and corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occu-
61. U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2951, at 58 (1990).
62. Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 148. See COMMENTARY, supra note 12 at 602.
63. The term "grave breaches" in S.C. Res. 674 appears to cover not only grave viola-
tions of international humanitarian law, but also grave violations of international diplomatic
law.
64. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg. (April 8, 1991).
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pation of Kuwait."68 Clearly such damage and injury were due, inter alia,
to grave breaches of international humanitarian law. These violations
were committed both before and during the war, with the mistreatment
of third-State nationals, the oil spill into the Gulf, the burning of oil
wells, the indiscriminate use of Scud missiles against civilian populations,
etc. In accordance with the cease-fire resolution, all claims, are to be ex-
amined by a Commission established to administer a fund which will pay
compensation for such claims. 66
The cease-fire resolution does not deal with the obligation of Iraq
under the Geneva Conventions to punish or extradite the perpetrators of
these grave breaches, although penal sanctions for grave breaches are at
least as important as monetary compensation. However, as long as Sad-
dam Hussein remains in power, it is quite unlikely that he or his high
officials would be tried in Iraqi courts for war crimes. The question is
then whether another state would prosecute him or whether an interna-
tional criminal tribunal would be established to try him. A number of
states, particularly European states, were in favor of the latter
approach.1
7
H. Recognition of the Special Role of the ICRC with Respect to the
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law
The special role of the ICRC in the implementation of international
humanitarian law has been recognized by the Security Council on a num-
ber of occasions. In particular, the Security Council has tried to facilitate
the work of the ICRC. The Council has, for instance, called for allowing
units of the ICRC into a conflict area to evacuate the wounded and pro-
vide humanitarian assistance, or for facilitating the dispatch and distri-
bution of aid by the ICRC. 9 In the Gulf War Cease-fire Resolution 687 of
3 April 1991, the Security Council requested Iraq to co-operate with the
ICRC for the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, by
providing lists of such persons, facilitating access to those persons by the
ICRC and facilitating the search by the ICRC of unaccounted persons.
70
65. See also S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 2978th mtg. (Mar. 2, 1991).
66. The Commission was formally established by S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 2987th
mtg. (May 20, 1991). For more details on the functioning of the compensation mechanism,
see, e.g., the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 19 of Security Coun-
cil resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/22559 (1991), and the Letter Dated 2 August from
the President of the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission
to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/22885 (1991), Security Council resolu-
tions 705 (1991), 706 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and 712 (1991) of 19 September 1991.
67. U.N. Press release DH/869 of April 16, 1991, referring to a decision taken by the
European Community to put Saddam Hussein on trial for war crimes.
68. S.C. Res. 436, U.N. SCOR, 2089th mtg. (Oct. 6, 1978), dealing with the situation in
Lebanon.
69. S.C. Res. 512, supra note 26, also relating to Lebanon. In the same resolution, the
Security Council also appealed to Member States to provide the most extensive humanita-
rian aid possible.
70. See also S.C. Res. 686, supra note 65.
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The Security Council has also underscored the role of the ICRC with
respect to prisoners of war. 7' The Council urged that a comprehensive
exchange of prisoners of war between Iran and Iraq be completed shortly
after the cessation of hostilities, in co-operation with the ICRC; 72 the
Council also demanded that Iraq arrange for immediate access to and re-
lease of all prisoners of war under the auspices of the ICRC, even before
the formal cessation of the Gulf War.7 Moreover, the Security Council
has encouraged the co-operation between the United Nations and the
ICRC for humanitarian aid, for example for the distribution of foodstuffs
in Iraq and Kuwait,7' and the repatriation of Kuwaiti and third country
nationals after the Gulf War.75 Finally, on a number of occasions, the Se-
curity Council has paid tribute to the work of the ICRC, particularly in
providing emergency humanitarian assistance.
7 1
Apart from the specific tasks entrusted to the ICRC under the Ge-
neva Conventions, the Committee is more generally considered to be the
"guardian" of the Geneva Conventions. 77 Thus, it was involved in major
developments concerning the Conventions, such as the adoption of the
Additional Protocols.78 Another such development was the proposal by
the Secretary-General that the Security Council call for a meeting of the
High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention to discuss
possible measures that might be taken by them under the Convention to
ensure its implementation.7 9 It was therefore quite appropriate that the
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to develop the idea fur-
ther "in co-operation with" the ICRC. s0
71. The special position of the ICRC in this respect is recognized, inter alia, by the
Third Geneva Convention, art. 125.
72. S. C. Res. 582, supra note 53.
73. S.C. Res. 686, supra note 65. As far as Iraqi POWs are concerned, the Council sim-
ply "welcomed" the decision of Kuwait and the Allied Forces to release them in accordance
with the Third Geneva Convention, under the auspices of the ICRC. Id.
74. S.C. Res. 666, supra note 30.
75. By S.C. Res. 687, supra note 64, the Security Council invited the ICRC to keep the
Secretary-General informed of its activities in this respect. This co-operation was again
mentioned in S.C. Res. 706, U.N. SCOR, 3004th mtg. (Aug. 15, 1991). The relevant informa-
tion from the ICRC is included in a report from the Secretary-General submitted pursuant
to the latter resolution. U.N. Doc. S/23012 (1991). See also U.N. Doc. S/23514, Annex, sec.
D (1992) for additional information from the ICRC.
76. See the statement of the President of Nov. 11, 1983, U.N. Doc. S/16142 and S.C.
Res. 542, U.N. SCOR, 2501st mtg. (Nov. 23, 1983), both relating to Lebanon.
77. Report submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in accordance
with resolution 672 (1990), U.N. Doc. S/21919, 1 24 (1990).
78. See supra note 2.
79. U.N. Doc. S/21919, 24 (1990). It should be mentioned that Protocol I, art. 7 pro-
vides that the depositary
... shall convene a meeting of the High Contracting Parties, at the request of
one or more of the said Parties and upon the approval of the majority of the
said Parties, to consider general problems concerning the application of the
Conventions and of the Protocol.
80. S.C. Res. 681, supra note 35. Pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General has
indeed engaged in consultations with the ICRC on the matter. U.N. Doc. S/22472, 1 6
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I. Resolution 688
All the cases mentioned so far relate to international armed conflicts.
The Security Council broke new ground in the aftermath of the Gulf
War. On April 5, 1991, the Council adopted Resolution 688 regarding the
repression by Iraq of part of its civilian population, particularly Iraqi
Kurds, and the need for humanitarian assistance to that population."1
This of course raised the general issue of the respect for human rights,
but also, in as far as parts of the population had begun an internal strug-
gle against the regime, the question of compliance with international hu-
manitarian law. Resolution 688 did not expressly characterize the Iraqi
actions as violations of the rules of international humanitarian law appli-
cable to non-international armed conflicts. However, the United King-
dom, Belgium and Luxembourg made this point in their statements
before the Council.
8 2
The problem for the Security Council is Article 2, paragraph 7 of the
Charter, which precludes the United Nations from intervening in "mat-
ters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
This provision was mentioned in Resolution 688. The Council circum-
vented Article 2, paragraph 7 by characterizing the consequence of the
repression of the Kurds, namely their massive flight from Iraq to neigh-
boring countries, as a threat to international peace and security. This is
of course an issue outside the scope of Article 2, paragraph 7, one the
Council is competent to address.
Another argument is that once an area, previously exclusively regu-
lated by municipal law, is also covered by international law, then activi-
ties within such an area can no longer be characterized as "matters essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction." This argument is used
particularly with respect to human rights, but is also valid for the inter-
national regulation of internal armed conflicts. Nevertheless, states are
clearly very reluctant to accept any infringement on issues they consider
within their sovereignty. Moreover, the characterization of a situation as
an internal armed conflict, triggering the application of humanitarian law,
is in most cases very controversial.
(1991).
81. This resolution was further interpreted as providing a legal basis for the establish-
ment by the United States and its allies of safe havens for the Kurds in northern Iraq. For a
discussion of the legal arguments, see Lewis, Legal Scholars Debate Refugee Plan, Gener-
ally Backing U.S. Stand, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 1991, at A8. The United Nations subse-
quently assumed responsibility for the relief centers, in accordance with an agreement
reached between the United Nations and Iraq on April 18, 1991. U.N. Doc. S/22513 (1991).
Moreover, units of United Nations guards were deployed in order to strengthen the humani-
tarian presence of the Organization. U.N. Doc. S/22663 (1991).
82. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2982, at 66, 67, 73 (1991). All three speakers referred to the Geneva
Conventions, Common article 3 of which provides that certain minimum rules apply in the
case of an armed conflict not of an international character. These minimum rules include
the humane treatment of civilians.
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IV. EVALUATION AND POSSIBLE FUTURE MEASURES
Until the Gulf War, the actions of the Security Council with regard
to the implementation of international humanitarian law have been pri-
marily of a declaratory and hortatory nature. The Council called atten-
tion to a number of breaches of humanitarian law by states, and even
condemned them. This in itself could bring some political pressure on the
state concerned. Unfortunately, it did not prove particularly effective,
and the violations did not always cease. The Security Council, with the
assistance of the Secretary-General, monitored developments in specific
cases, such as the occupied territories in the Middle East, but it did not
resort to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to achieve
respect for international humanitarian law until the invasion of Kuwait.
In this case as well, the violations of Iraq were admittedly not stopped by
the Council, but the Security Council devised measures to deal with the
consequences of these acts in particular by establishing a mechanism for
monetary compensation.
One declaratory measure adopted by the Security Council with re-
gard to the implementation of international humanitarian law has been,
however, quite important. Indeed the repeated statements on the applica-
bility of the Fourth Geneva Convention in certain situations have pro-
vided a consistent assessment by the international community of the ille-
gality of certain acts over the years. Moreover, as discussed, such
statements have generally characterized a territory as occupied, which has
substantial legal and political implications.
The Security Council has focused primarily on the implementation of
the Fourth Geneva Convention, in particular with respect to illegal settle-
ments and deportations, but it has also, when necessary, used the 1925
Geneva Protocol and the Third Geneva Convention, as well as general
international humanitarian law, including to some extent the right to re-
lief. Thus, ratione materiae, the scope of the Security Council's actions
has been relatively broad. This is not the case with respect to the situa-
tions addressed. Indeed, the Security Council has been quite selective in
this regard. It has dealt with three cases primarily: the Middle East and
the occupied territories, the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and the inva-
sion of Kuwait. Consequently, the Security Council has pointed the finger
at only a few of the states which have committed breaches of humanita-
rian law in all these years.
The Security Council's role in the implementation of international
humanitarian law, while important and necessary, has been limited by
significant shortcomings. The political and moral effect of the Council's
actions has been far greater than their practical impact in preventing
human suffering. The question thus arises: What else could the Council
do when states violate international humanitarian law?
The Security Council has the power to adopt binding measures under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Such measures include
complete or partial economic sanctions as well as the use of force. This
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latter method is both disproportionate and inappropriate for stopping vi-
olations of humanitarian law. But are sanctions adequate responses to vi-
olations of international humanitarian law?
The answer depends on the kind of violations involved. In cases of
the use of prohibited means of warfare and/or indiscriminate attacks on
civilian population, an arms embargo appears appropriate. As already
mentioned, when the use of chemical weapons had been established in the
Iran-Iraq war, the Security Council called upon states to apply export
controls for products serving for the production of chemical weapons.
83
Why not go further and declare a comprehensive and binding arms em-
bargo which would include products with potential military use? It would
seem appropriate for the international community to target sanctions at
the very means of perpetrating atrocities. Undeniably, the moral effect of
an arms embargo weighs more than a simple request by the Security
Council to cease the violations. As for the practical effect, presumably,
the state involved would have enough arms to continue its violations of
international humanitarian law, at least for some time. In an extended
war, though, the import of arms would indeed be needed eventually.
This solution, however, is not easily applicable to all cases. For exam-
ple, what would happen if only one of the parties to the conflict is, to the
best of the Council's knowledge, using prohibited means of warfare ? An
arms embargo against all parties to the conflict would unfairly penalize
those states which respect international humanitarian law. An arms em-
bargo against only that state which has violated humanitarian law may
involve the Council in unduly disturbing the military balance betweeen
the parties. These points may be hypothetical, since it is more likely that
all those involved violate international humanitarian law, rather than one
state only, but this underscores the difficulty of prescribing adequate re-
sponses for the Security Council.
As for the duration of the arms embargo, it seems reasonable to
maintain it until the end of the conflict. Although designed to punish a
state for its use of prohibited weapons or its indiscriminate attacks on
civilians, an arms embargo would hopefully in most cases also curtail the
duration of the conflict. 4
In a case of violation of humanitarian rules governing occupation, the
response should be different. In one instance of illegal settlements by the
occupying power, the Security Council has called upon all states not to
provide the occupying power with any assistance which would be used
specifically in connection with those settlements.8 In this case, the Coun-
cil's decision was not binding. Couldn't the Council go one step further
83. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
84. This was also the motivation of the Council when it declared an arms embargo
against Yugoslavia "for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia." S.C.
Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg. (Sep. 25, 1991).
85. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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and render such measures binding on all states? This type of economic
sanction, which targets the precise scope of the violation, seems more ap-
propriate than a comprehensive economic embargo. The latter, apart
from being a disproportionate response, would most likely cause unjust
suffering to the population of both the state concerned and that of the
territory it occupies. On the contrary, a "tied" economic sanction may
result in the desired cessation of illegal acts to the extent that these de-
pend on financial assistance.
What could the Council do, however, in the case of mistreatment of
nationals of an occupied territory or aliens? It is not possible to give a
general answer. Economic sanctions would probably not have the poten-
tial direct effect described above of stopping these actions, at least not in
the short term. They may, however, be justified on other grounds.
86
Most commentators would share the view that the Security Council
has recently shown an ability to innovate. Given the evidence of its rec-
ord, as outlined in this article, it will hopefully find new ways of ensuring
respect for international humanitarian law, and consequently strengthen
the role it has played so far.
86. For instance, the Security Council decided to apply economic sanctions on Iraq by
Resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, as a response to the invasion of Kuwait. The issue
of Iraqi violations of international humanitarian law in Kuwait was raised by the Council at
a later stage. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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